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People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers:
California Gropes for a Civil Obscenity
Standard
by PETER F. FROST*
I
Introduction
Recent years have seen an increase in the use of civil nui-
sance actions to combat obscenity.' The use of a civil action to
deal with conduct which was originally regulated solely by
criminal statutes raises questions as to whether civil or crimi-
nal standards should apply at trial. The issues of appropriate
remedies and trial procedures in obscenity nuisance abate-
ment actions in California were first addressed in 1981 in Peo-
ple ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers [hereinafter Gow II] .
The California Court of Appeal in Gow II rejected many of
the remedies allowed by the trial court. The appellate court
went on to uphold the use of a criminal standard of proof in the
determination of obscenity vel non,3 but dealt only tangentially
with another key procedural issue, the requirement of a jury.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to
consider the appropriate standard of proof, holding that the
federal Constitution does not require the use of a criminal
standard.4 On remand the California appellate court settled on
* Member, Third Year Class; A.B., University of Southern California, 1976.
1. See generally F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, 192-99 (1976).
2. 114 Cal. App. 3d 923, 171 Cal. Rptr. 85, rev'd in part sub nom. Cooper v. Mitchell
Brothers, 454 U.S. 90 (1981). This was the second in a series of actions against the
Mitchell Brothers. The first was People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana
Theatre, 101 Cal. App. 3d 296, 161 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1980) (Gow I); the third was People ex
rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana Theatre, 118 Cal. App. 3d 863, 173 Cal. Rptr. 476
(1981) (Gow III).
3. Vel non literally means "or not." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1394 (5th ed. 1979).
The determination of obscenity vel non is the threshold determination of whether a
contested material is protected by the first amendment.
4. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers, 454 U.S. 90 (1981).
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requiring proof of obscenity vel non by clear and convincing
evidence.5
This note considers the reasoning of both courts but, as the
civil public nuisance abatement action is controlled by state
law, 6 the note concentrates on the decisions of the California
Court of Appeal. After a brief discussion of the history of nui-
sance abatement actions as applied to obscenity, the note
deals with Gow II and the propriety of certain remedies sought
by the plaintiff-city therein. Finally, it discusses the standard
of proof and the jury trial requirement.
A. History of Public Nuisance Actions as Applied to Obscenity
The foundation for the use of a civil action to enjoin the exhi-
bition of obscene materials was laid as early as 1957, when the
United States Supreme Court ruled that states are not limited
to the criminal process to control pornography. The Court did
require that any procedures used to determine whether mater-
ials are obscene must ensure "the necessary sensitivity to free-
dom of expression."8  To prevent the suppression of
constitutionally protected expression two basic procedural
rules were established in Freedman v. Maryland.' First, the
burden of proving that the contested expression is unprotected
must rest on the censor. Secondly, and more important to the
focus of this note, a state may not bar future exhibitions of a
contested expression without a prompt judicial determination
that the expression is unprotected. 10 "Any restraint imposed
in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must
... be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest
fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution""
To determine whether particular materials are protected ex-
pression or obscene, hence unprotected, courts have been di-
rected to refer to the "contemporary community standard."'
2
Lower courts are free, however, to apply a state or a local stan-
5. People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana Theatre, 128 Cal. App. 3d
937, 180 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1982).
6. See infra note 24.
7. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957) (provisions of the New
York state Code of Criminal Procedure allowing injunction of sale of specified obscene
publications held not violative of due process).
8. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US. 51, 58 (1965).
9. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
10. Id.
11. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
12. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
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dard, as judicial delineation of a "precise geographic area" is
not required by the federal Constitution. 3
With the maturation of the "community standards" principle
came the maturation of the public nuisance action as an anti-
obscenity tool. As a public nuisance is generally understood to
be one which "affects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood. .. ,,,1 a more restrictive definition of the "com-
munity" affected by contested materials made the nuisance ac-
tion more feasible for individual city complainants.
The California Supreme Court, in People ex rel. Busch v. Pro-
jection Room Theatre," sanctioned the use of a public nui-
sance abatement action to enjoin the exhibition of obscene
materials. At that time, however, the court provided no gui-
dance for California's trial courts either on remedies available
in such actions or procedures to be used at trial. 6 Although
neither remedies nor the appropriate standard of proof had
been ruled on prior to 1976,17 the United States Supreme Court
had addressed the jury trial issue in 1973, in its per curiam de-
cision, Alexander v. Virginia.8 There the Court held that a
jury trial was not constitutionally required in civil obscenity
actions brought pursuant to the Virginia statute involved.
In 1980 the Court again approved the use of public nuisance
abatement actions to enjoin the exhibition of specified obscene
films,'9 but repeated the Freedman rule that future exhibitions
could be enjoined only after a judicial determination of the ob-
scenity of the particular film in question.2 °
13. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974).
14. See infra note 24.
15. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130
Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. den. sub noma. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theatre, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
16. Busch dealt only with a trial court's judgment sustaining a demurrer without
leave to amend. People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers, 114 Cal. App. 3d 923, 929
(1980).
17. Prior to Busch, the action had not been widely used in California. Although
the Busch court cites several cases which used the process in other jurisdictions to
control obscenity, see 17 Cal. 3d at 57-60, the court relies chiefly on one California case,
Weis v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 730, 159 P. 464 (1916). In Weis the California Court
of Appeals held that nude dancing at an International Exposition attraction known as
the "Sultan's Harem" constituted a public nuisance subject to abatement.
18. This was not a thoroughly reasoned decision. Even though there was argu-
ment before the Court, the Court issued only a two sentence per curiam opinion. 413
U.S. 836 (1973).
19. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
20. Id. at 317. For a thorough history of obscenity law see F. SCHAUER, supra note
1, at 148.
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California's municipal governments did not widely utilize
the public nuisance action against obscenity until after the
Busch decision,21 and Busch left several procedural questions
unanswered. 2 The California appellate court attempted to an-
swer those questions with its decision in Gow H.
B. People ex rel. Gow v. Mithell Brothers
1. Trial Court
People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers (Gow 11)23 was an
action brought by Santa Ana city attorney Keith Gow to abate
a public nuisance as defined by California Civil Code sections
3479 and 3480.24 The complaint alleged that defendant owners
and operators of a movie theatre were perpetuating a public
nuisance by their continuing exhibition of allegedly obscene
films. 25 Among the remedies sought by the plaintiff-city were a
request for damages and a $100,000 bond from the defendants.26
A jury decided the issues of obscenity, public nuisance and
21. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
22. See supra text accompanying note 16.
23. 114 Cal. App. 3d 923, 171 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1981).
24. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3479 (West 1970):
Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses,
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the com-
fortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage
or use in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream or
canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street or highway, is a nuisance.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 3480 (West 1970): "A public nuisance is one which affects at the same
time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be
unequal."
25. Although initiated by the city attorney, the action was tried by a private attor-
ney, Mr. James J. Clancy.
Clancy is a Naval Academy graduate and a one time submarine officer de-
scribed by many as a zealot. He has dedicated his legal career to purging soci-
ety of pornography and, as an active voice in the Citizens for Decency Through
Law, has carried his crusade nationwide. His purpose, he said, is to preserve
order in society. "[Pornography] always has been used throughout the ages
as a means of destroying order-order within the family, order within the com-
munity, order within the system. It's a tool of revolution," he said. Given the
choice between good and evil, Clancy said, man will choose the evil road and
must be prodded toward the good.
Runzler, Santa Ana Fails to e(X)ile Porno Kings, THE REGISTER, Aug. 2, 1981, at B-1.
26. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 927. The city also sought as relief, 1) revocation of
defendants' operating license and permits; 2) a permanent injunction banning the
showing of the named films; 3) forfeiture of the defendants' box office receipts; 5) re-
moval of defendants' theatre fixtures and movable property for sale by police and;
6) punitive damages and attorney's fees.
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damages prior to the court's decision on the equitable issues."
The jury was read over fifty separate instructions, including
one which required that the obscenity of the challenged film be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.28
Of seventeen films viewed by the jury, eleven were found ob-
scene and two not obscene. No verdict was reached on the re-
maining four.29 The jury awarded the city $76,400 in damages,
and the court ordered defendants to deposit $100,000 in trust as
"insurance" against the future costs of such actions.30
2. Appellate Courts
The California court of appeal affirmed in part and reversed
in part, holding that the action was properly brought but that,
under the applicable public nuisance statutes, 31 injunctive re-
lief was the only remedy available to the plaintiff city. The
Busch decision specifies that it is the exhibition of fims which
is the nuisance, and not the theatre itself. Enjoining the exhi-
bition abates the nuisance. Therefore, where the suit is
brought to abate the nuisance, injunction of the exhibition of
particular obscene films is the only remedy available.2
The city also appealed the granting of a jury trial as a matter
of right, but as the city was not harmed by that decision, the
court rejected its contention. The court did address the jury
issue in a footnote, saying that although it appeared that a jury
was not required in civil obscenity cases, there was contrary
authority.33 Finally, the court upheld the requirement of proof
27. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 927.
28. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 928.
29. Id.
30. On equitable issues the trial court held that the defendants' box office receipts
did not have to be placed in a constructive trust and that their theatre could remain
open under their current license. The trial court held for the plaintiff-city by perma-
nently enjoining the exhibition of the eleven films which had been found obscene. The
prints of those eleven films were ordered destroyed, and the city was awarded $5,869.31
in costs. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 928.
31. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 931; CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 1970):
An action may be brought by any person whose enjoyment is lessened by a
nuisance.., and by the judgment in such action the nuisance may be en-
joined or abated as well as damages recovered therefore. A civil action may be
brought in the name of the people of the State of California to abate a public
nuisance.., by the city attorney of any town or city in which such nuisance
exists ....
32. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 932.
33. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 934 n.12. There the court noted that Paris Adult Thea-
tre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), approved civil actions to regulate obscenity as long as
the state law "meets the First Amendment standards set forth in Miller v. California
No. 11
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of obscenity vel non beyond a reasonable doubt.34
Gow II was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
under the name Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers.35 The Court there
held, per curiam, that the criminal standard of proof was not
constitutionally required in such actions, but that states could
independently require such a standard.36 Three justifice dis-
sented from the grant of certiorari. Two of the three, Justices
Marshall and Brennan, argued for requiring the use of a crimi-
nal standard." On remand the California appellate court set-
tled on requiring proof of obscenity vel non by clear and
convincing evidence in a public nuisance action.38
(413 U.S. at p. 69)." In Miller the Court called for a continued reliance on the jury
system. See infra text accompanying note 97.
34. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 932.
35. 454 U.S. 90 (1981). The California Supreme Court denied petitions for hearing
and plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
36. Cooper, 454 U.S. at 93.
37. Certiorari was granted and a per curiam opinion issued without the benefit of a
brief from defendants. The case was decided solely on the plaintiff's brief. See Cooper,
454 U.S. at 94. Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the granting of certiorari,
questioning the Court's jurisdiction on a case which they felt was not clearly decided
on federal grounds. In the alternative, they dissented from the court's holding on the
burden of proof. 454 U.S. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented
separately from the granting of certiorari and ruling on the merits without the benefit
of briefs and argument. 454 U.S. at 94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana Theatre, 128 Cal. App. 3d
937, 180 Cal. Rtpr. 728 (1982). On remand the California Court of Appeal specifically
invoked state constitutional provisions in their decision, insulating it from further fed-
eral intervention. 128 Cal. App. 3d at 940. Their original decision, however, could just
as well have been supported by independent state grounds. The majority of the U.S.
Supreme court in Cooper evidently believed that the California Appellate court under-
stood that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required by federal
law. It is by no means clear that such was the California court's position. While at one
point the California court said, "We agree with the trial court that the issue of obsceni-
ty vel non in a public nuisance abatement action must be proved beyond a reasoabl
doubt," other passages indicate that the court was making an independent determina-
tion based on its examination of the authorities. E.g., "Although we agree with the
entire 'burden of proof' portion in the Brennan [dissenting] opinion, one passage is
particularlypersuasive." 114 Cal. App. 3d at 936 (emphasis added). Although the Cali-
fornia court's rationale in originally approving the use of a standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is ambiguous, they "surely [knew] the difference between opinions
that merely contain persuasive reasoning and opinions that are authoritative because
they explain a ruling that is binding on lower courts." Cooper, 454 U.S. at 96 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The California court's repeated references to Justice Brennan's dis-
senting opinion in McKinney v. Alabama seem to indicate that it was fashioning a rule
of law independent of federal pronouncements and imposing a stricter procedural rule
on state courts subject to its jurisdiction.
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The California Court of Appeal dealt primarily with the city's
standing to recover damages and the possible "chilling effect"39
of the trial court's requiring a $100,000 deposit to insure against
the costs of future abatement actions.
The court's disallowance of damages finds support both in
legislation and in policy. The city's complaint in Gow II was
brought pursuant to California Civil Code section 731. Section
73110 includes provisions for abatement of the nuisance and the
award of damages when the action is brought by a "person."
The statute has a separate provision allowing injunction alone
in actions brought by a municipality. It appears that the city's
attempt to recover damages in this case did indeed "borde [r]
on the frivolous."'" A cursory reading of the statute reveals
that the legislature intended there be two separate paths to-
wards nuisance abatement, one for individual persons and one
for corporate municipalities. While a private person may sue
for damages, the municipality's only remedy is abatement of
the nuisance-in this case, stopping the exhibition of obscene
films.' A municipality is not operated for profit and cannot
claim to suffer monetary loss from the showing of obscene
films within its borders. It would therefore have difficulty es-
tablishing a basis for the award of compensatory damages. 43
The trial court's requirement that defendants deposit
$100,000 in trust as insurance against the future costs of such
actions raises more serious questions. Such a requirement
would cast a pall over the defendants' business, threatening
heavy financial losses if the defendants' appraisal of a film as
not obscene were overturned in an abatement action. In such
39. Lockhart, Escape From the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the First
Amendment, 9 GA. L. REv. 533 (1975).
40. See supra note 31.
41. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 931.
42. Whether a private corporation may sue for damages is not addressed by either
the California statute or the court in Gow H. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
43. Although the named plaintiff in a public nuisance action is a public official, the
people affected are the citizens. While a fine may be appropriate punishment for a
criminal act, it seems that damages awarded in a public nuisance action could not be
fairly allocated among the affected parties.
No. 1]
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an atmosphere of fear, borderline films are as likely to be sup-
pressed as obscene films.
Particularly in the case of motion pictures, it may take very lit-
tle to deter exhibition in a given locality. The exhibitor's stake
in any one picture may be insufficient to warrant a protracted
and onerous course of litigation. The distributor, on the other
hand, may be equally unwilling to accept the burdens and de-
lays of litigation in a particular area when, without such diffi-
culties, he can freely exhibit his film in most of the rest of the
country .. .
The net effect is prior restraint.45 While that result was surely
the city's goal, the first amendment's free speech provisions
abhor such results.
Any system of prior restraint must overcome a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity.' The presumption
may be overcome by a showing that the expression sought to
be suppressed is not protected by the first amendment.47 A
valid showing that expression is unprotected, however, may
only be made in an adversary hearing at which specific proce-
dural safeguards are applied.48 In addition, where speech is
concerned courts must be careful to tailor the sanctions im-
posed to the degree of the problem presented.49 Any injunc-
tions issued must be restricted to specific books or films, and
not applied "against the premises in which the material is sold,
exhibited or displayed."5 0
44. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
45. The first amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the imposi-
tion of a restraint on a publication before it is published. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931). Obscene publications are not protected by this policy, but "an invalid prior
restraint is an infringement upon the constitutional right to disseminate matters that
are ordinarily protected by the first amendment without there first being a judicial
determination that the material does not qualify for First Amendment protection."
State v. I, A Woman-Part II, 53 Wis. 2d 102, 191 N.W.2d 897, 902-03 (1971).
46. Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-559 (1975); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
47. Freedman, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
48. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 559-560. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 9-11.
49. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-511 (1951). Dennis involved the con-
viction of communist party members for advocating the overthrow of the government.
The Court held that such activity could be punishable if there was a "sufficient danger
of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent to justify application of the
statute under the First Amendment." Id. at 494. "In each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510 (quoting United States v.
Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
50. Busch, 17 Cal. 3d at 59.
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Here the trial court's threat of severe financial penalties for
defendants' future exhibition of contested materials worked to
bypass the necessary judicial determination of obscenity vel
non. It also acted as an informal restraint against defendants'
whole business, rather than an injunction against the exhibi-
tion of specific materials. The potential for such substantial li-
ability for the exhibition of contested materials could
completely preclude the defendants from operating their legiti-
mate business. Such "backdoor" prior restraints have been
overturned more than once5 1 and were properly overturned in
this case.
B. Trial Procedures
When potentially constitutionally protected acts may draw
both criminal and civil suits it is not always evident which pro-
cedural rules should govern the civil remedy. In the usual
case, the biggest factor in determining which rules govern is
the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected.
In criminal cases, the liberty of the accused is at stake; courts
zealously protect the freedom of the accused by incarcerating
him only if a jury finds his conduct reprehensible. No similar
right can necessarily be inferred in a civil case between party
and part when only property is at stake. 2
Though it is a civil action, the obscenity nuisance abatement
proceeding concerns more than just party against party, and
considerably more than mere property is at stake. In any ob-
scenity case first amendment considerations dominate the pro-
ceedings. To many the first amendment is of paramount value
to our society, for it protects and fosters that free flow of infor-
mation so vital to our participative government. The first
amendment's central importance to our society is the reason
51. See Mayor of Savannah v. TWA, Inc., 233 Ga. 885, 214 S.E.2d 370 (1975) (attempt
at prior restraint by denial of license and padlocking store), Sanders v. State of Geor-
gia, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974) (attempt to totally enjoin bookstore's operation,
charging that store was nuisance); Penthouse International v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353
(5th Cir. 1980) (attempt to prevent sale of certain magazines by select arrests of deal-
ers of magazines which were found objectionable by individual police officers); Drive
In Theatres, Inc. v. Huskey, 435 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1970) (County sheriff announced that,
in his judgment, all "X" and "R" rated films were obscene and published his plan to
confiscate all such films if any attempt was made to exhibit them within his jurisdic-
tion. Court held sheriffs actions were improper prior restraint.) For further discus-
sion of informal censorship see Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards 45 MmN. L REv. 5, 6-9 (1960).
52. Melancon v. Keith, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1043, affd mem., 409 U.S. 943 (1972).
No. 11
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courts "remain profoundly skeptical of government claims that
state action affecting expression can survive constitutional
objections. 53
The need for procedural safeguards at trials determining
whether contested expression is protected has long been rec-
ognized.54 For example, the procedure under which a warrant
is issued to seize allegedly obscene materials must be
designed to focus "searchingly" on the question of obscenity.
55
Although a jury's determination of obscenity has been held not
essential in civil actions,56 courts have been adjured to rely on
the jury system in obscenity cases to safeguard significant con-
stitutional interests.
57
To require only a civil standard in obscenity cases
has the collateral effect of depriving a defendant of the jury
trial to which he would be entitled in a criminal prosecution for
violating exactly the same standards of public policy. The de-
fendant also loses the protection of the higher burden of proof
required in criminal prosecutions and, after imprisonment and
fine for violation of the equity injunction, may be subjected
under the criminal law to similar punishment for the same
acts.58
The sensitivity of the issue, free speech, compels the adoption
of more powerful protections than those afforded by the civil
standards.
1. Standard of Proof
The purpose of a standard of proof is to "instruct the fact
finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks
he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication. ' 59 These standards of proof are
generally recognized in the law. In a civil case, typically in-
volving a money or property dispute between the parties, a
mere preponderance of the evidence suffices. Society has little
53. Thomas v. Board of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir.
1979).
54. "[A] state is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with
obscenity ... without regard to the possible consequences for constitutionally pro-
tected speech." Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961); See supra notes 9-
11 and accompanying text.
55. Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968).
56. Alexander, 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
57. Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
58. People v. irm, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 880, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941) (citations omitted).
59. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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stake in such disputes and therefore attempts to place the liti-
gants on a somewhat equal footing.60 At the other end of the
spectrum is the original standard of "proof beyond a reason-
able doubt." In criminal cases the defendant's interest in
avoiding the more severe criminal penalties justifies the use of
this most stringent of standards.61 The standard of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is regarded as a critical part of the
"moral force of the criminal law, '62 and courts have been hesi-
tant to apply it "too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases.
' '
63
Between these two standards is the standard of "proof by
clear and convincing evidences." The "clear and convincing"
standard is a test of the belief engendered in the trier of fact, as
opposed to the mere presentation of a quantum of evidence. It
requires evidence "which is so clear, explicit, and unequivocal
as to leave no substantial doubt and which [is] sufficiently
strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reason-
able mind. '6 4 To meet the standard of "clear and convincing"
evidence "the witnesses to a fact must be found to be credible
and ... the facts to which they have testified ... distinctly
remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in
due order .... [T]he testimony [must] be clear, direct, and
weighty and convincing, so as to enable [one] to come to a
clear conviction without hesitancy of the truth of the precise
facts in issue."65 The clear and convincing standard or one of
its variants has been used often in civil cases, 66 particularly in
those involving allegations of quasi-criminal conduct.67
Although the United States Supreme Court did not require
the use of a criminal standard in proving the obscenity of con-
tested materials, a state may independently require a standard
stricter than a mere preponderance.6 8 There are cogent argu-
ments for requiring a stricter standard. The defendant in a
civil obscenity action loses some basic protections enjoyed by
60. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
61. Id.
62. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
63. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428.
64. In re Jost, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379, 383, 256 P.2d 71, 74 (1953).
65. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Paddock, 301 F.2d 807, 811 (5th Cir. 1962).
66. See Cooper, 454 U.S. 90 (1981).
67. "See, e.g., Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (deportation); Chaunt v.
United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960) (denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943) (denaturalization)." Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
68. Cooper, 454 U.S. 90 (1981).
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a criminal defendant.69 When the action involves potentially
constitutionally protected expression, a strict standard of proof
should not be lost. The question is whether use of the strictest
standard of proof is either necessary or appropriate.
It would seem that the California Court of Appeal saw the
need for a strict standard as they originally approved the use of
a criminal standard in Gow II. The court there was persuaded
by Justice Brennan's dissent in McKinney v. Alabama, where
he stated
In the civil adjudication of obscenity vel non, the bookseller
has at stake . . . an "interest of transcending value"-protec-
tion of his right to disseminate and the public's right to receive
material protected by the First Amendment. Protection of
those rights demands that the factfinder be almost certain-
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt-that the materials are
not constitutionally immune from suppression.
7 0
Justice Brennan felt that only by requiring such a degree of
confidence in the correctness of the factfinder's conclusion
could society ensure that protected materials would not be er-
roneously suppressed.71 In addition, the possibility of self-cen-
sorship due to fear of civil judgment (causing sellers to become
over-cautious about the materials with which they deal) would
become more remote. The possibility of such self-censorship
as an informal prior restraint prompted the California appel-
late court to invalidate the trial court's requirement of a
$100,000 bond from the defendants in Gow 11.72 Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the merits in
Cooper,73 reiterating the views he expressed in McKinney v.
Alabama .74
A final argument for use of the criminal standard is that ob-
scenity has long been solely within the province of the criminal
law in California. If this action were brought under the appli-
cable penal code,75 both scienter and the commission of the
necessary overt acts would have to be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.
69. For example, in a civil case, the defendant could be ordered to submit to a
deposition. In a criminal case the same defendant could refuse to testify.
70. McKinney, 424 U.S. at 684 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
73. Cooper, 454 U.S. at 94, see supra note 37.
74. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1970).
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There are more persuasive reasons, however, for not adopt-
ing the criminal standard. This is a civil action and would nor-
mally require only a preponderance of the evidence.76 More
importantly, the defendant in a civil action does not face the
more serious sanctions faced by the criminal defendant. The
less demanding standards of the civil action are more appropri-
ate for its less threatening judgments. If prosecutors are re-
quired to meet a criminal standard in a civil case they may
tend to forego the civil in favor of a more final and perhaps
more damaging criminal judgment.77 For the standard of proof
there is a middle ground. California courts can adopt, and one
Court of Appeal has approved, the standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence for the proof of obscenity vel non in a public
nuisance abatement action.
As noted above,78 the standard of proof by clear and convinc-
ing evidence is extremely demanding yet is free of criminal
connotations. Its use gives the defendant significantly greater
protection than the "mere preponderance" test, but sets the ac-
tion apart from criminal prosecutions. It has frequently been
applied in quasi-criminal actions and so is particularly appro-
priate here. While neither the federal nor the California Con-
stitution mandates any specific standard of proof for the
obscenity determination in a nuisance abatement action, the
"clear and convincing" standard seems best suited to its
peculiarities.
While the "clear and convincing" standard has been adopted
by one appellate court, trial courts outside that district are not
bound by that decision.79 While other appellate courts in
76. CAL. EVD. CODE § 115 (West 1970).
77. Further, in obscenity causes the usefulness of a final civil judgment as a start-
ing point for subsequent criminal prosecutions is questionable. A California court has
disallowed the defense of collateral estoppel in an obscenity case. The defendant's
contention that the film at issue had been declared not obscene in a prior proceeding
was held inapplicable, as the defendant had not been party or privy to the prior action.
People v. Seltzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 52, 101 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1972). The use of res
judicata as a basis for obscenity actions against the same corporate party defendants
in a different community is an unsettled issue. It is doubtful whether res judicata and
collateral estoppel concepts can be validly applied, using the "contemporary commu-
nity standards" theory, if the limits of the community are not clearly defined. For ex-
ample, at best it can be said that sales of allegedly obscene materials at international
airports affect a very amorphous community. As res judicata and collateral estoppel
are complex and difficult doctrines and have been the sole subjects of other notes, they
will not be dealt with further in this note.
78. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
79. People v. Yeats, 66 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879, 136 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1971); but see
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California may use the decision in Gow H as precedent, they
are also free to disagree. The repeated agreement of other
courts may eventually establish the standard throughout the
state but, in lieu of such a trend, the state supreme court must
settle the issue or the legislature must act.
2. Jury Trial
The California Constitution guarantees the right to trial by
jury in civil actions.8 0 Trial by jury has been held to be a mat-
ter of right in actions at law but not in actions in equity. 1 Al-
though the traditional distinction between actions at law and
actions in equity has been the remedy sought,82 California
courts have varied from that approach. In People v. One 1941
Chevrolet Coupe83 the California Supreme Court recognized
that the right to jury trial at common law was constantly evolv-
ing and concluded that "in determining whether the action was
one triable by a jury at common law, the court is not bound by
the form of the action but rather by the nature of the rights
involved and the facts of the particular case-the gist of the
action .84
Although both penal obscenity codes and public nuisance
codes were in force in 1872,85 their combined use did not gain
prominence in California until the Busch86 case in 1976. This is
a new action, and new rules must be developed to deal with it.
The "gist of the action" theory has given California courts room
to develop new procedural standards for those actions which
do not fit the traditional molds. It can apply analogously to this
civil action to abate obscenity as a public nuisance.
As an action to abate a nuisance sounds in equity, 7 any pro-
posal for requiring a jury's determination of obscenity in such
an action deserves the most careful scrutiny. A suit seeking
Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. Inglewood-L.A. County C.C. Authority, 40 Cal. App. 3d 98,
101, 114 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974) (normally court will follow decisions of other districts).
80. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16. The state supreme court has interpreted this as a guar-
antee of the right as it existed when the state constitution was adopted in 1850. People
v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 286-287, 231 P.2d 832, 835 (1951).
81. Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. 2d 438, 462, 326 P.2d 484, 498 (1958).
82. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westober, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
83. 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951).
84. Id. at 299, 231 P.2d at 843-844 (emphasis added).
85. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 311, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1970). The original
version of § 311 was enacted in 1858, the original version of § 3479 in 1872.
86. See supra note 17.
87. C. REMBAR, THE LAw OF THE LAND 305 (1980).
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only to enjoin a nuisance is an action in equity, an action which
does not require a jury trial.88 Neither does the federal Consti-
tution require a jury trial in civil proceedings to determine the
obscenity of contested materials.89 While an adversary hearing
is a required procedural safeguard in all obscenity actions,9" a
jury need not be a part of that hearing. Indeed, some jurisdic-
tions are satisfied with a magisterial determination of
obscenity.91
The United States Supreme Court's requirements, however,
are only the lowest limit, the quantum of protection that will
satisfy the applicable provision of the federal Constitution. In-
dividual states may require stronger, more comprehensive pro-
tections under their state statutes or state constitutions.92
California courts are free to find that their state constitution
does require the use of a jury in civil obscenity proceedings.
Finally, obscenity has traditionally been a criminal matter.93
The same arguments which support the requirement of a strict
standard of proof support the requirement of a jury trial. Were
the city to bring a criminal action for exactly the same objec-
tionable conduct the defendants would be entitled to a jury
trial with a unanimous verdict.9 4 But the criminal action's
more difficult requirements, involving jury trial, are appropri-
ate for its graver punishments. The civil action's less demand-
ing standards are appropriate for its less threatening
judgments. If criminal procedures were required for both
criminal and civil determinations of obscenity, prosecutors
could as easily bring criminal cases as civil. They might there-
fore be disposed to forego civil complaints in favor of gaining a
more final criminal conviction.95 The availability of both ac-
88. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433 (1830) (recovery of payment in contract action).
89. Alexander, 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
90. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
91. See Trans-lux v. State of Alabama, 366 So. 2d 710 (1979); People v. Potwora, 95
Misc. 2d 350 (1977) (magistrate decides issue of obscenity prior to seizure; cf. Zeitlin v.
Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963) (words of statute fix only
the standard to be applied, not the entity which will apply it).
92. Cooper, 454 U.S. at 93.
93. See generally Lockhart, supra note 39.
94. However, some states require less than unanimous verdicts even in serious
crimes. See LA. CONsT. art. 1, § 17 (West 1977); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 782
(West 1981). OR. CONST. art. 1, § 11; OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (1979-1980).
95. Although most criminal prosecutions result in fines, some statutes provide for
a maximum of five years imprisonment. F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 197.
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tions, with their differing standards, may discourage criminal
prosecutions.
There are compelling arguments, however, for requiring a
jury's determination of obscenity. First, the value of a jury in
obscenity decisions was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Miller v. California,96 which pronounced the
revised "contemporary community standards" test for obscen-
ity. There the Court stated that, in applying the test, to resolve
the "inevitably sensitive questions of fact and law, we must
continue to rely on the jury system, accompanied by the safe-
guards that judges, rules of evidence, presumption of inno-
cence, and other protective features provide .... ,9 Secondly,
the importance of first amendment freedoms mandates the use
of the most effective means of implementing that most difficult
test. Trial by jury is the most effective means.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in McKinney v. Alabama,
stated:
The jury represents a cross section of the community and has a
special aptitude for reflecting the view of the average person.
Jury trial of obscenity therefore provides a peculiarly compe-
tent application of the standard for judging obscenity which, by
its definition, calls for an appraisal of material according to the
average person's application of contemporary community
standards.98
Jurors can use their knowledge of their community to deter-
mine what would be patently offensive to a member of that
community.99 However educated, fair and insightful a judge
might be, one who is no part of a community cannot claim to
have the same viewpoint as its members. The "outsider" is by
definition not part of the group and should not be tasked with
determining what the group will accept or reject. The standard
of judgment being that of the whole community, even a single
individual from that community should not be the factfinder.
Personal prejudices seem bound to surface. In our pluralistic
society the ideal method of implementing the "community
standards" test would be a referendum on the community's
view of specific contested materials. As the ideal is impracti-
cal, the best solution left is trial by jury. A jury is only a cross
96. Miller, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
97. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
98. McKinney, 424 U.S. 669, 688 (quoting Kingsley Bocks, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. at
448) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974).
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section of the community, but as members drawn from he com-
munity's ranks, the jurymembers as a group are best able to
draw their community's line over which speech crosses into
obscenity. 10 0
Finally, one of the most important protections provided by
the jury system is the assurance that jury findings will not be
easily overturned in a higher court.10 1 The need for such assur-
ance was exemplified by the results of Penthouse International,
Ltd. v. McAuliffe, 102 where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed a lower court's magisterial determination of obscen-
ity. The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision on
several issues, in two instances finding material obscene which
the lower court has declared not obscene. As obscenity is to be
determined according to local standards, it seems that the find-
ings of the courts closest to the community in question should
be given great weight. The Fifth Circuit's action in Penthouse
International instead rendered ineffective the lower court's
determination of what was objectionable in its community.10 3
To summarize, in Miller v. California the Court appears to
have favored the use of a jury trial as the best method of imple-
menting the community standard theory. Members of the
community composing the jury are most familiar with the com-
munity's standards. In addition, a jury's finding of fact would
be more difficult to overturn than a magisterial finding, and so
would better insulate a community's decision from arbitrary
intervention by higher courts. Use of a jury would therefore
protect defendants, contested materials and community stan-
dards to the greatest degree possible.
III
Conclusion
The California appellate court in Gow II necessarily consid-
ered issues common to all civil obscenity actions-remedies
short of prior restraint, the appropriate standard of proof and
the requirement of a jury trial. Deciding the issue of appropri-
100. See McKinney, 424 U.S. at 687-689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 13.8 (2d ed. 1977).
102. Penthouse International Ltd., 610 F.2d at 1373.
103. Although reviewing courts are to exercise independent appellate review,
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), the Fifth Circuit's statement that they were
as able to determine the applicable community standards as the lower court surely
overstepped the bounds of permissible appellate review. 610 F.2d at 1364.
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ate remedies required a fair interpretation of the applicable
statutes and a sensitivity to the effect of severe financial sanc-
tions -on free expression. The California court provided these
and went on to require proof of obscenity vel non by clear and
convincing evidence in civil actions. However, the standard of
proof and jury trial issues will not be finally settled until either
the state supreme court or state legislature acts. Either can
adopt standards stricter than those required by the United
States Supreme Court and should do so.
For the questions of standard of proof and jury trial require-
ments, traditional procedural formalities must yield to the
overpowering first amendment considerations inherent in this
new action. When interests of such "transcending value"104 are
at stake, the use of a quasi-criminal standard of proof in a trial
by jury will guard against the risk of arbitrary decisions. ° As
noted by the California appellate court in Gow I1, the United
States Supreme Court statements regarding jury trial in civil
obscenity cases are inconsistent,10 6 and no standard of proof
has been dictated.1
0 7
The California judiciary, however, has the legal machinery to
remedy these ills. Analogizing to the "gist of the action" test,
California courts can adjust their procedures to require these
stricter protections as part of this new action. Until California
establishes these safeguards statewide, as an integral part of
its civil obscenity actions, its proceedings will be deficient be-
cause there will be room for intrusive reversals of community
obscenity determinations, and the "chill of uncertainty" 0 8 now
inherent in obscenity law will maintain its sway.
104. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
105. See supra note 101.
106. Gow, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 934 n.12.
107. Cooper, 454 U.S. 90 (1981).
108. Lockhart, supra note 39.
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